Homer Simpson’s Logic
U.S. nuclear posture is based on the assumption that placing thousands of nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert deters our adversaries from taking unacceptable military action. But we should question the logic that more is always better. Much like Lisa Simpson in this classic Season 7 episode about Springfield’s ‘War on Bears,’ we often speciously conclude that large stockpiles of nuclear weapons inherently add to the credibility of deterrence. They don’t. Deterrence with lower numbers of nuclear weapons can be just as stable as with massive numbers.
James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment concludes in his new Adelphi paper, “Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security,” a world with low numbers of nuclear weapons (around 500 in the US, for example) can be just as safe and stable as our current world.
Not everyone agrees. The issue came up for discussion in a recent Senate Armed Services Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces hearing, where some Republican senators bemoaned the administration’s efforts to pursue further bilateral reductions of nuclear arms with Russia. Despite being reminded that every president since Harry Truman, with the exception of George W. Bush, has supported the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, these senators refuse to accept that updating U.S. nuclear policy for the post-Cold War era has any security benefits for the United States.
On the contrary, the U.S. stands to gain real security benefits from negotiating the multilateral reduction of global nuclear arsenals. Deterrence can fail. Accepting the nuclear status quo does nothing to mitigate that serious threat. By decreasing global nuclear arsenals in a responsible manner we can reduce the global risk that nuclear weapons again get used.
One way to begin this process in the United States is to direct the pentagon to realign our strategic posture around a zero-based targeting study. As Acton claims in his study, planning for obliterating the entire Russian command and control structure is unnecessary for deterrence and mostly leads to excess weapons and riskier alert postures. Instead, the U.S. can reduce the number of targets (and hence weapons) to the minimally sufficient number for Russia and China to be deterred. Acton uses the number 500 in his study, arguing that having more does not increase the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. I believe that Russia and China could be adequately deterred with less than 500 warheads – or perhaps just a small rock.
For future analysis, the important question will be “how low can we go without eroding stable deterrence?” I believe this number could take us well below 500 nuclear weapons. U.S. policy-makers need to address this question in order to nudge the defense establishment out of Cold War habits. Perhaps then we can stop acting like the Homer Simpson’s of the world and avoid paying for expensive weapons that do not add to our national security.
Homer Simpson’s Logic
U.S. nuclear posture is based on the assumption that placing thousands of nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert deters our adversaries from taking unacceptable military action. But we should question the logic that more is always better. Much like Lisa Simpson in this classic Season 7 episode about Springfield’s ‘War on Bears,’ we often speciously conclude that large stockpiles of nuclear weapons inherently add to the credibility of a deterrent. If there are benefits to reducing global nuclear arsenals, and lower numbers of nuclear weapons are just as stabilizing as massive numbers, should we not consider negotiated reductions?
James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment concludes in his new Adelphi paper, “Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security,” a world with low numbers of nuclear weapons (around 500 in the US, for example) can be just as safe and stable as our current world.
This issue also came up for discussion in a recent Senate Armed Services Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces hearing, where some Republican senators bemoaned the administration’s efforts to pursue further bilateral reductions of nuclear arms with Russia. Despite being reminded that every president since Harry Truman, with the exception of George W. Bush, has supported the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, these senators refuse to accept that updating U.S. nuclear policy for the post-Cold War era has any security benefits for the United States.
On the contrary, the U.S. could gain some real security benefits from negotiating the multilateral reduction of global nuclear arnseals. For example, smaller forces leave less fissile materials around for terrorist networks or illicit networks to buy, build, or steal. One way to begin this process in the United States is to direct the pentagon to realign our strategic posture around a zero-based targeting study. As Acton claims in his study, it is unnecessary nowadays to think about obliterating the entire Russian command and control structure. Instead, deterrence of the future should be based on identifying high-value Russian and Chinese targets, until multilateral agreements are negotiated (Note: North Korean or Iranian arsenals can be deterred with far fewer weapons). I believe that Russia and China could be adequately deterred with even fewer than 500 warheads.
Overall, Acton’s work, which is concerned with maintaining international stability during the disarmament process, importantly concludes that having more than 500 nuclear weapons does not increase the credibility of U.S. deterrence.
When it comes to the practical steps for gradual and multilateral reductions, however, Acton is rather pessimistic. He fears that political realities and individual state security concerns may trump disarmament momentum in the near-term. Other experts are more optimistic. For example, the Sustainable Partnership with Russia group, a collection of US and Russian defense experts, recently released a report with recommendations for accelerated and deeper bilateral nuclear reductions. They argue that this process can be made easier by capitalizing on the momentum of the ratification of the New START Treaty.
For future analysis, the important question will be “how low can we go without eroding stable deterrence?” I believe this number could take us well below 500 nuclear weapons. More importantly, we should encourage the Pentagon to grapple with this question in order to lift the defense establishment out of a Cold War mindset. Perhaps then we can stop acting like the Homer Simpson’s of the world and avoid paying for expensive weapons that do not add to our national security.
