The Prague Project

With Osama bin Laden’s death comes a reminder of how disrupting terrorist networks can be successful and effective.  It is a reminder about how the war on terror can and should be fought: not with grand strategies of regime change, but as an intelligence war.

On May 1, 2011 an elite Navy SEAL team overseen by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) conducted a raid on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden.  A decade-long manhunt was concluded by integration of intelligence analysts and special forces units.  Since 9/11, JSOC has tripled in size and has developed a close relationship with American intelligence gatherers and analysts.

This is how the U.S. effectively uses force in the 21st century.  Not ground troops or regime change, just investment in intelligence gathering and Special Forces.  JSOC commands units that disrupt terrorist networks and make it harder for rogue actors to buy, build, or steal weapons of mass destruction.

It is also important to recall that massive nuclear arsenals have nothing to do with this kind of victory.  Nuclear weapons cannot deter terrorists.  Instead they make us less secure by leaving more fissile material vulnerable to theft.  By reducing the size of global nuclear weapons stockpiles and securing nuclear materials, we can help prevent WMDs from falling into terrorist hands.

Since terrorism, and in particular nuclear terrorism, is the greatest threat to security today, we must orient our military to meet it.  That means putting less emphasis on building nuclear weapons and more emphasis on checking their spread.  In the war on terror we should not expect a perfect success-rate, neither should we expect no casualties.  But the days of full-scale land wars must end.  The bin Laden raid is an example of an effective use of force in the 21st century.

I found a dusty policy paper on our office bookshelves that made a startling statement: “Through 1980, under the present course, direct spending on U.S. tactical air forces is projected to exceed $100 billion.” William White cautioned about these soaring prices when he wrote the above-quoted 1974 policy paper “U.S. Tactical Air Power: Missions, Forces, and Costs.”

Of course, he was writing about the costly F-14 and F-15 programs. Little did he know that the F-35 would replace the F-15 decades down the road with a jaw-dropping unit cost of $133.6 million a plane and lifetime operating costs eyeballing the trillion dollar mark. Alas, Washington is about to make a spirited round of arguments about the F-35 that likely were already made in the 1970s over other airframes.

The more things change, the more they stay the same. 

Below for your reading pleasure are a select few quotes from his chapter on warplane costs. The feeling upon reading the text should seem familiar to anyone who has heard an oldie tell them of the price of a hamburger in the 1950s. Enjoy.

The extent of the problem is easily illustrated. During the peak procurement year of World War II (1943) the Army Air Corp committed $2.47 billion to purchase tactical aircraft: fighters and light and medium bombers of a dozen popular types. For fiscal year 1975, the Air Force requested $1.07 billion to buy modern airplanes for the same tactical purposes. The difference is that in 1943 the Army got 24,847 airplanes for its money; this year the Air Force wants to buy 98.  The average cost of a tactical warplane procured in 1943 was $99,400. In 1975 it will be $10,900,000.

For those of you following at home, DoD requested $9.7 billion to purchase 32 F-35s in the FY 2012 budget.

Compared to other kinds of aircraft, the climb in unit costs for tactical warplanes appears less extraordinary, though even in this company the tactical air curve remains prominent, exceeded only by the growth for strategic bombers. (The B-1, if produced, will probably be at least 200 times as expensive as the heaviest bombers of World War II.)…

Whatever one’s position on the value of tactical air power, its appropriate claim on the finite resources available for national defense, or the mission capabilities it should seek to achieve, the upward trend in the unit cost of tactical aircraft and where it may be leading can only be cause for concern.

One quote of White is more tragically funny than others:

Rather than accept the risk of an abrupt confrontation a few years hence with a generation of aircraft that have priced themselves out of the weapons marke, as did the Army’s MBT-70, it seems wise to face the issue of unit costs squarely now by trying to identify what factors have caused the steep climb and by considering means of breaking free of the spiral.

The U.S. still seems locked in this spiral, with little hope of breaking free. Perhaps the budget belt-tightening currently in vogue will begin to restrain the escalating costs of major weapons systems. More likely, maybe 37 years down the road, someone will look back on this blog and say, “The more things change…”

Tonight at 9:00 pm The History Channel will be showing Countdown to Zero, a riveting documentary about the global threat of nuclear weapons and the imperative of seeking a world without them.

A film by the academy-award winning producers of An Inconvenient Truth, Countdown is a compelling and eye-opening film. It explains in clear terms the nuclear threat we face and the global imperative of seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons.  It features interviews with Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, Pervez Musharraf, Tony Blair, and Ploughshares Fund’s own Joe Cirincione.

The film makes a frightening observation.  In the 21st century, an odd twist of fate has left us in a world where the threat of nuclear war has receded, but where the likelihood of a nuclear attack – by accident, miscalculation, or madness – has increased.  Thousands of nuclear missiles remain on hair-trigger alert around the globe and terrorists are seeking the means for nuclear destruction.  Given the complexity and unimagineable risks of this status quo, the film makes the case that going to zero is the best path to security.  Catch the trailer below.

In April 2009, President Obama made it the official policy of the United States to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Beginning with the Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Security Summit, the United States led the way towards reducing the role the nuclear weapons play in national defense and securing loose and vulnerable nuclear materials around the world. The New START Treaty, signed between the United States and Russia, began the process of much needed bilateral arsenal reductions, and talks are ongoing for the next arms control treaty.

As Countdown to Zero illustrates, we cannot afford to lose this momentum and must continue to reduce global nuclear arsenals and lock down vulnerable nuclear materials to keep them out of the hands of terrorists. The film provides a powerful message about our security and delivers a rallying cry for the necessary global elimination of nuclear weapons.

So pick up some popcorn on the way home and tune in to The History Channel at 9:00 pm. You can also stream the film through Netflix. Either way, you need to see this movie.

On April 5th, 2009, two years ago today, young President Barack Obama rose to the podium in Hradčany Square at the heart of historic Prague, Czech Republic. In one of his most eloquent and significant foreign policy speeches, Obama took up the mantle of American leadership and reoriented U.S. policy towards the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.

“Today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” said Barack Obama, barely two months into his presidency.

It was not a policy rooted in idealism or naiveté. Rather it recognized the concrete steps necessary to begin the long journey of persistent nuclear reductions and most importantly normalized the goal of nuclear zero for decades to come.

The Prague Agenda was laid out with four main objectives:

1. Reduce the total number and role that nuclear weapons play in the defense postures of nuclear-armed nations
2. Strengthen the international nonproliferation regime by holding rogue states accountable
3. Secure loose and vulnerable nuclear materials around the world while strengthening international cooperation on nuclear security
4. Support the safe and secure growth of nuclear power in ways that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies

Despite the well-known ups and downs of his tenure in office, President Obama has largely stuck to his nuclear principles and elevated the level of discussion around the long-sought vision of a nuclear weapon-free world. The vision, codified in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, preached by Ronald Reagan, endorsed by the Four Horsemen, and resurrected by Barack Obama, remains key to ensuring the safety and security of the United States.

Despite major successes like the Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Security Summit, and the New START Treaty, much work remains to be done. Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is necessary to stem the production of new nuclear weapons and limit dangerous and destabilizing posturing between nuclear states. The negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must move forward (with or without the Conference on Disarmament) to stop the flow of the dangerous ingredients for nuclear warheads. The United States and Russia must reach an agreement to cooperate on ballistic missile defense in order to build confidence for further reduction of nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic. None of these tasks will easy and they are only the part of a larger plan, but the work is already underway.

It will be an uphill battle, no corners can be cut, and progress must often be made incrementally. Still, it is clear that the vision of a nuclear-free world is alive and well in 2011.

The reasons for such a policy have not changed in the last two years. Assessing the threat in 2009, Obama remarked: “Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.” Terrorists still seek to buy, build, or steal nuclear material and thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert, threatening to be launched by accident, miscalculation, or madness.

We need not live under this shadow of nuclear annihilation much longer. Leadership and persistence on concrete policy goals can alter the course of history. As Obama concluded in Prague, “Human destiny will be what we make of it. Here, in Prague, let us honor our past by reaching for a better future. Let us bridge our divisions, build upon our hopes, and accept our responsibility to leave this world more prosperous and more peaceful than we found it.”

Two years hence the United States must continue to embrace the vision of a nuclear-free world. It is desirable, it is possible, and it is necessary.

President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on March 23, 1983, twenty-eight years ago today.  Part of a vision for a future without the constant threat of nuclear annihilation, SDI became a hot-button issue between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Coincidentally, the issue of missile defense is being debated today between the United States and Russia, with Secretary Gates and Vice President Biden having both visited Moscow in the last two weeks.

On this timely anniversary, we should all sit down and read “Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons” by Paul Lettow.  Perhaps then we would understand that true story of Reagan’s SDI and how hyper-conservative missile defense hawks have abandoned both their history and sensible foreign policies.

Missile defense proponents, like Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC), claim to be continuing Reagan’s legacy. “President Reagan fought to achieve peace through strength,” wrote DeMint in an op-ed on his blog, “And in doing so he led the U.S. to win the Cold War and put in place the beginnings of groundbreaking missile defense technology to protect our nation from rising threats. And ever since, the left has sought to stop, block, and defund our critical missile defenses that are continually proving to be successful and necessary.”  DeMint proposes an expensive, technically impossible, and potentially catastrophic plan to deploy hundreds of missiles around the world.

This is not at all what Reagan intended.

According to Lettow’s well-argued monograph, Reagan never let his mind stray from his ultimate goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.  SDI was intended as a necessary step forward in order to eventually draw down.  “I happen to believe,” wrote Reagan, “that an effective defense weapon could bring closer the day when we could all do away with the nuclear threat.”

Furthermore, Reagan stated: “In my opinion, if a defensive weapon could be found and developed that would reduce the utility of these [missiles] or maybe even make them obsolete… Then [the President] could offer to give that same defensive weapon to [our adversaries] to prove that there was no longer any need for keeping these missiles.  Or with that defense, he could then say to them, ‘I am willing to do away with my missiles.  You do away with yours.’”

As Lettow puts it, “From the very beginning, Reagan had in mind that SDI would catalyze the elimination of all nuclear weapons, and that sharing a missile defense with the adversaries of the United States would play a role in that process. “

Whether or not Reagan understood the instability that SDI would introduce into US-USSR relations or truly believed in its technological feasibility, he latched onto it as a policy goal that would transform the superpower dynamic.

Even just the idea of missile defense was useful for Reagan in encouraging the Soviet Union to come to the negotiating table.  The idea of SDI represented a new military strategy that could harness the strength of American innovation and leave the USSR in the dust technologically.  Wanting to avoid a military space race, the Soviet Union really had no choice but to try to make an agreement on arms control.

Reagan also understood that the purpose of missile defense is not to provide an impenetrable shield that makes fallout shelters and duck-and-cover drills unnecessary.  Dreaming about an airtight seal around the United States is an exploitative misinterpretation of Reagan’s intentions and a blatant overestimation of the technical capabilities of missile defense.  For example, physicists estimate that the SM-3 Interceptor, which is crucial to U.S. missile defense plans, has a success-rate of about 20 percent.

Reagan instead sought defensive weapons as a step on the way to nuclear-zero. So, if we can manage to negotiate treaties that reduce nuclear arsenals without the need to spend billions of dollars on ineffective technologies, why not continue to reduce our stockpiles?

Reagan was working from the standpoint of a tense period in the Cold War.  In the 21^st century world, our leaders should recognize the ineffectiveness of introversion and advocating policies based on Cold War fears.  The problems of nuclear weapons in the modern era can only be solved collectively.  Building higher walls does nothing to make us safer when it comes to nuclear weapons, unless we cannot get to the table in the first place.  Reagan understood this principle, but his contemporary colleagues do not.