The Prague Project

The 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) produced agreement on a Middle East WMD-free zone Conference to be held in 2012.  According to UN understandings, a WMD-free zone limits chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as delivery vehicles for those devices.  Much of the Conference details remain a mystery, but proponents need to begin planning sooner rather than later.

A WMD-free zone in the Middle East is not a new idea. Some states, like Egypt, have been behind the idea for decades, and it was discussed at the 1990 RevCon.  All Middle Eastern nations, including Israel, have agreed to participate in the 2012 Conference, but the support is not solid.

Despite earlier commitments to the goal of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, Israel repudiated the language of the 2010 NPT consensus agreement:

This resolution is deeply flawed and hypocritical: It ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world. It singles out Israel, the Middle East’s only true democracy and the only country threatened with annihilation. Yet the terrorist regime in Iran, which is racing to develop nuclear weapons and which openly threatens to wipe Israel off the map, is not even mentioned in the resolution.

The Israeli statement further concluded: “as a non-signatory state of the NPT, Israel is not obligated by the decisions of this [NPT] Conference, which has no authority over Israel.”  The statement was a harsh reaction to the RevCon’s resolution that called out Israel for not disclosing its nuclear weapons, but it does not rescind Israel’s earlier agreement to participate in a 2012 WMD-free zone conference.  In 1980 Israel agreed to a UN resolution expressing the goal of establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.  Moreover, Israel seems to genuinely want a WMD-free Middle East, as the negotiating processes could bolster Israeli security and territorial integrity.

Many Arab nations are interested in pursuing a WMD-fee zone as a way of eliminating Israeli nuclear weapons.  Original proposals at the 2010 RevCon made Israel’s joining of the NPT a precondition to a WMD-free Conference, but the final draft merely noted that Israel’s entrance into the NPT would be part of the process of creating a WMD-free zone.  Calming regional tensions will also be part of the process and two perplexing issues need to be dealt with before any WMD-free zone can become a reality: Iranian nuclear proliferation and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

In a recent panel discussion held at the Hudson Institute, David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, expressed skepticism and concern about the 2012 Conference.  He fears that failure to make progress in 2012 might undermine faith in the process overall, and that postponing the Conference may be the better option.

Above all, trust in the verification regime must be cultivated before a WMD-free zone is possible in the Middle East.  The IAEA has failed on too many occasions to catch proliferators in a timely fashion, and most states are as yet unwilling to trust an international organization with matters of security.

Instead of fixating on the daunting nature of the goal of a WMD-free zone, the conference should make progress by committing states to a series of interim steps paving the road to a WMD-free future. For example, states could sign and abide by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, pledge to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 2015, lay the groundwork for sharing the status of missile programs and establishing of system of missile launch notifications. Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, believes that these interim confidence-building measures, along with a “full-court press” on Iran and reducing Arab-Israeli tensions, could put the Middle East on the most promising track toward becoming a nuclear and other WMD-free zone.

Much like the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, the goal itself is valuable.  Normalizing foreign policy discussions around disarmament has the long-term benefit of shaping future policy decisions.

The question remains whether it would be a good idea to have the conference at all in 2012 if the outlook is dim for any kind of agreement. Some think that it would be better to postpone rather than risk a fruitless meeting that would result in lost faith in the process altogether. Others maintain that discussion of the pathway towards a WMD-free Middle East could be important in itself, or that the discussion might become a catalyst for the resolution of other regional disputes.  Conference organizers can begin now by selecting the right venue and facilitator for 2012.  The sooner we begin planning, the better.

On Monday Israeli ex-intelligence chief Meir Dagan made public his reassessment of the Iranian nuclear threat and pushed back his estimated timeline of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Long story short, he now believes that Iran will not be able to build a nuclear weapon until 2015.

On the same day, Hillary Clinton spoke to an audience in the United Arab Emirates and for the first time publically stated that sanctions are “working” in Iran and that they are having a direct effect on the Iranian ability to build a nuclear bomb. “The most recent analysis is that the sanctions have been working.” Clinton said. “They have made it much more difficult for Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions.”

As this new year begins and the 112th Congress convenes with a new mandate, it may be helpful to look back at the record of the 111th Congress to get a sense of existing sentiments regarding U.S. foreign policy. Congress’ role in foreign policy is by nature weak, except in matters of declaring war and military spending. Nonetheless, in the case of Iran, Congress could exert pressure on the administration by raising the heat and demanding decisive action to counter Iranian nuclear ambitions–creating an atmosphere that could undermine diplomatic efforts.

At this point, most experts see military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran as more dangerous than beneficial. Yet the new leadership in the House of Representatives may bring with it a different outlook on how to deal with would-be nuclear proliferators.

A number of ultimately stalled bills were introduced in the House and the Senate pertaining to the Iranian nuclear threat in the 111th Congress. While most of these bills were concerned with amending or strengthening the existing sanctions regime, some included provisions to prepare for the use of military force against Iran. Most of these bills languished in the Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations Committees without hope for passage; however, they do provide a snapshot of congressional sentiments regarding how to deal with Iran.

In October 2009, Rep. Trent Franks (AZ-2) introduced a bill (H.R. 3832) that would have acknowledged Iran’s record of misconduct relating to terrorism funding and human rights violations and directed the Secretary of Defense to develop military plans for striking at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Rep. Pete Sessions (TX-32) similarly advocated force by proposing legislation (H.R. 557) with 96 cosponsors that condemned Iran and recognized the right of Israel to defend itself against the imminent Iranian threat. While of course it is true that Israel has a right to defend itself and that it is a strong ally of the United States, advocating military force against Iran at this point is damaging for the region as a whole.

Rep. Louie Gohmert (TX-1) took the most aggressive stance last year, when he introduced a resolution (H.RES. 1553) that provided implicit American support for Israeli military strikes on Iran and received 46 cosponsors. Such declarations, if made official by Congress, could hamper the administration’s ability to calm regional tensions and handle the issue diplomatically.

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18), now the influential chair or the Foreign Affairs Committee, is noticeably absent from these lists of cosponsors, but her rhetoric during the 111th Congress was troubling. In a November 2009 op-ed for The Hill, Ros-Lehtinen complained about American appeasement of Iran, writing: “Chamberlain’s plea to talk over problems with Hitler in order to satisfy his ‘reasonable’ demands brought not peace but catastrophe. We must put away the begging bowl and pick up the stick.” Wow.

While it is clear that Iranian nuclear progress has slowed, a healthy debate still reigns over what is causing the delay. No matter the cause, the Obama Administration now has some extra flexibility to deal with Iran diplomatically. The crucial goal during the course of the 112th Congress, therefore, is to avoid succumbing to the pressure of more hawkish representatives and continuing to marginalize calls for military actions that risk broader regional war. Of course the military option is always on the table, but for now the United States needs to pursue a dual-strategy of sanctions and engagement, without being undercut by a loud caucus of hawks in Congress.

In a recent article in Foreign Policy, Karim Sadjadpour drew some comparisons between the Soviet Union and Iran.  “Like the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic is a corrupt, inefficient, authoritarian regime whose bankrupt ideology resonates far more abroad than it does at home,” Sadjadpour claims.  “Also like the men who once ruled Moscow, Iran’s current leaders have a victimization complex and, as they themselves admit, derive their internal legitimacy from thumbing their noses at Uncle Sam.”

Sadjadpour is on the right track with his analysis.  The U.S. experience during the Cold War does hold lessons for contemporary foreign policy directed at Iran and its nuclear program.  Taking Sadjadpour’s observations one step further, are there lessons that we can extract about U.S. views on the use of preventative force – the kind that hawkish pundits advocate using against Iran?

As with hawkish stances toward Iran today, there were proposals in the late 1940s for using military strikes to keep the Soviets from getting the bomb.

The idea of launching a preventive war against the Soviet Union was a serious option on the table between 1947 and 1949.  In fact, the Joint Chiefs approved numerous war plans (Pincher, Broiler, and Crankshaft to name a few) to disable Soviet nuclear sites.  All that was needed was the president’s approval.  Certain U.S. military officials, like Generals Curtis LeMay and Orvil Anderson, were quite vocal in their support for preemptive strikes, even involving the possible use of atomic weapons.

What conditions checked such an idea then, and can they be replicated now?  It’s difficult to understate how much the world and the nuclear proliferation landscape has changed since the dawn of the Cold War.  However, the decision-making process that would be involved in the preemptive use of force is more or less the same.

At the beginning of the Cold War, it took doves like George Kennan as well as hawks like Paul Nitze to come together and make the case against using force. To those who wanted to bomb the Soviets while the United States still held overwhelming power, the Gaither Report and even NSC-68 may plausibly be interpreted as helping to shut the door on preventive war as a real policy option.  The drafters of those documents, which set the stage for lengthy internal debates on containment and counterforce as opposed to preemption, ultimately won over President Truman, who famously concluded, “There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be stopped by war.  You don’t ‘prevent’ anything by war except peace.”

Of course, the historical analogy only goes so far.  Iran is not likely to emerge as a challenger to the international balance of power.  The main fear is that a nuclear-armed Iran could prompt damaging emulation strategies in its region and beyond, greatly increasing the likelihood that a nuclear weapon could be used.  As during the Cold War, however, the United States and its allies retain a whole range of options – diplomacy, sanctions, and even conventional deterrence – to respond to a relatively weak nuclear proliferator.  But such options are viable only if the application of preventive force is avoided.

Probing the early Cold War analogy can help determine the best path for steering clear of the use of nuclear weapons in the 21^st century.  Let’s look to history before contemplating decisions to let the bombs fly.

U.S.-Russia relations are seeing a sharp upswing since their low point during the Georgia crisis in 2008.  Part of this is because of the Obama Administration’s “reset” helped prime the bilateral relationship for international security and economic cooperation – the capstone of these efforts being the New START treaty.  If New START falls victim to Senate inaction, it could harm all facets of our relationship with Russia.

Obama and Medvedev meet at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit

Last week, the Russian Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachyov commented to the press about his view of the US New START ratification process:

Many [in the U.S.] will be in principle against agreeing on anything with Russia. In that case we will have to start from scratch. That is the worst-case scenario — completely awful…For now, I do not want to believe in it.  If it collapses just because of internal political considerations of the United States that would be very bad.

“Very bad” here likely means the scuttling of cooperation on a number of issues – including keeping Iran from the bomb.

To help dissuade Iran from advancing its nuclear program, the international community, with the U.S. at the helm, recently brought into force a strong round of economic sanctions against Iran.  While biting, these sanctions require broad participation and enforcement to have any effect.  One fact of life: the U.S. cannot do it by ourselves.  No matter how hard we try, the U.S. cannot get nations to act as we please through sheer force of will (unless?).  To affect real change within the Islamic Republic, we need to coordinate policies with the world players – the European Union, China, and Russia.

The “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations plays into this effort by building better overall cooperation between the U.S. and Russia.  A key point of the reset has been Russia’s participation in economic sanctions against Iran.  Russia is Iran’s 8^th biggest trading partner, with $2.8 billion of total trade in 2009.  These ties are especially close in the energy sector.  Getting Russia to sour this trade relationship was no small feat, but was necessary for sanctions to have effect.  Somewhere in the mix of focused diplomacy and improved relations, the Obama administration persuaded Russia to do just that.

The diplomatic game isn’t over, and keeping the Russians on board with sanctions will require some relationship maintenance. With New START as the near-term focal point of U.S.-Russia relations, failure to ratify the treaty threatens to jeopardize this effort.

Keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is a crucial goal for U.S. national security.  Even a dysfunctional Congress can unite behind that idea – as seen in the 99-0 Senate vote passing the Iran sanctions bill (a bipartisan bill?!).  The Senate now needs to connect the dots between Russian support for these sanctions and the New START Treaty.  Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that you would be hard-pressed to find a U.S. Senator who stood to benefit from a nuclear-armed Iran.

The link between good US-Russia relations and an effective Iran sanctions regime is clear.  The United States cannot on the one hand reject international cooperation on nuclear arms reduction and, on the other hand, seriously expect Russia to help us squeeze Iran with economic sanctions.  The Senate must consider the bigger diplomatic picture in the upcoming lame duck session and consider the consequences if they fail to swiftly ratify New START.

Joe Cirincione, president of Ploughshares Fund, went in to talk with Stephen Colbert about the treat of nuclear weapons.  He came out accidentally married to Pakistan.

Be sure to see Colbert’s scientifically accurate illustration the effect of a nuclear blast… by pantomime.