Dr. Seuss and the CTBT
Over the course of the last few weeks there have been numerous thoughtful pieces written about the New START ratification process, lessons learned and, crucially, where we should/can go from here. Thinking about that last point I couldn’t help but be reminded of Dr. Seuss’s Oh, The Places You’ll Go – afterall, “there is [still] fun to be done!” One of the biggest questions circulating throughout the arms control community concerns the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), more specifically, when the treaty will get it’s chance back in the arena.
President Bill Clinton signed the CTBT, which bans all peaceful and military nuclear explosions in all environments, in 1996. However, in the Fall of 1999 it failed senate ratification with a vote of 51-48. To date the treaty has 182 signatures and has been ratified by 153 states – including nearly all of the United States’ NATO allies. The treaty and its monitoring system will take full effect once signed by remaining hold-out states – China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Indonesia, North Korea, and the U.S.
The arguments in the U.S. Senate against ratification in 1999 were simple and few. Treaty opponents argued that states’ compliance to the treaty not be verified and that the U.S. arsenal could not be certified as safe and reliable without nuclear testing. Over the last decade these arguments were severely undermined by improvements to the CTBT monitoring network and by years of scientific experience maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal without testing.
The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1992. In lieu of testing, policy-makers have maintained confidence in the U.S. nukes through the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and by developing Life Extension Programs (LEPs) for different classes of warheads. Indeed, it is widely accepted that through the SSP and LEPs we now know more about our arsenal than we ever did in the testing era. Such assertions were bolstered in 2007 with JASON’s release of their “Pit Lifetime” report, which asserts that, “most [plutonium pits] have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years…those with assessed minimum lifetimes of 100 years or less have clear mitigation paths that are proposed and/or being implemented.”
While confidence in the reliability and safety of our warheads has remained high, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the body responsible for verifying member states’ compliance with the treaty, has only improved its detection capabilities. As Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, the lead U.S. negotiator for the New START Treaty, remarked this week, “the International Monitoring System is now more than 80 percent complete. At the time of the initial Senate vote on the Treaty in 1999, none of the IMS stations had been certified as meeting approved technical specifications and operational requirements.” The International Monitoring System had two live-fire drills when North Korea tested its nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009 – both were promptly caught.
In Prague in April 2009, President Obama articulated his vision for a world without nuclear weapons and asserted that his Administration would “immediately and aggressively” pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT as an integral part of this vision. After New START was approved by the Senate, Gary Samore, the White House’s numero uno on nonproliferation and arms control issues, said that CTBT ratification was on his list and the Administration would “present [their] arguments [this] year, but [does] not know if they will have the desired effect.” The treaty faces formidable obstacles in the Senate from Sen. Jon Kyl, a handful of irreconcilable Republicans, and a general sense of post-START arms control exhaustion. Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) who led the floor debate in support of New START was also similarly reserved about prospects for CTBT ratification in the near term saying, “We have a lot of prep work to do before we contemplate that.”
Don’t let this get you down. As Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said in an interview about the New START ratification process, “it was first of all an education for a number of congressional members and staff who hadn’t looked at these issues in a long time.” Congress hasn’t looked at the CTBT in a long time, and as Sen. Kerry said, there will surely need to be some prep work.
Ultimately, as with New START, it is in the national interest of United States for the Senate to consider and approve the CTBT. We should do it. The question remains can we? I think the abiding lesson from the ratification of START is that, when the facts are assembled and the validators are present, the Senate can act responsibly towards our nation’s best interests. After many months of briefings and debate in the Foreign Relations Committee and on the Floor, a bipartisan coalition of Senators put national security above politics and ratified New START. There’s no reason why the same service can’t be done for the CTBT.








